WhatsApp has fixed three security flaws across its messaging apps, including an Android issue the company believes may have been used during a scam campaign to make fraudulent messages appear more convincing.
The main bug, tracked as CVE-2026-23871, affected WhatsApp and WhatsApp Business for Android versions before 2.26.17.4. The flaw involved incomplete validation of external URLs in replies to Click to WhatsApp ads. A crafted message could cause a recipient’s device to reveal IP information when it displayed media loaded from a server controlled by the sender, according to WhatsApp’s November security advisory. Version 2.26.17.4 is the fixed release threshold for both Android apps.
The advisory says the issue may have been abused alongside specific spam messages. A spokesperson told SecurityWeek that the company found the flaw while disrupting a scam campaign and believed a scammer was using it to make a message seem more credible.
Two other fixes cover different parts of the service. CVE-2026-102769 affected WhatsApp for Android before version 2.26.35.74. It involved a specially crafted “order details” message sent from an unofficial client. If a recipient tapped the message, the flaw could delete locally stored WhatsApp files and, when the recipient was online as the message arrived, reveal one bit of information about the chat database through a delivery-receipt timing side channel. WhatsApp lists 2.26.35.74 as the fixed version and said it had seen no evidence that this vulnerability was exploited in the wild.
CVE-2026-44908 affected the remote-attestation verifier used by WhatsApp clients to establish trust with Meta AI’s confidential-computing backend. It affected builds before 2.26.24.72 for WhatsApp on iOS, before 2.26.23.72 for WhatsApp Business on iOS and WhatsApp for Mac, before 2.26.23.74 for WhatsApp on Android, and before 2.26.23.70 for WhatsApp Business on Android. The flaw could have allowed someone positioned within Meta’s infrastructure to bypass the hardware root of trust by presenting a VCEK certificate signed by a key other than the hardware manufacturer’s. WhatsApp said the certificate would first need to be published to its third-party binary-transparency ledger, which showed that every published VCEK certificate chained to the hardware root of trust, confirming no exploitation.



